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Abstract Recent work has highlighted the vulnerability of many deep machine
learning models to adversarial examples. It attracts increasing attention to ad-
versarial attacks, which can be used to evaluate the security and robustness of
models before they are deployed. However, to our best knowledge, there is no spe-
cific research on the adversarial attacks for multi-view deep models. This paper
proposes two multi-view attack strategies, two-stage attack (TSA) and end-to-end
attack (ETEA). With the mild assumption that the single-view model on which
the target multi-view model is based is known, we first propose the TSA strategy.
The main idea of TSA is to attack the multi-view model with adversarial examples
generated by attacking the associated single-view model, by which state-of-the-art
single-view attack methods are directly extended to the multi-view scenario. Then
we further propose the ETEA strategy when the multi-view model is provided pub-
licly. The ETEA is applied to accomplish direct attacks on the target multi-view
model, where we develop three effective multi-view attack methods. Finally, based
on the fact that adversarial examples generalize well among different models, this
paper takes the adversarial attack on the multi-view convolutional neural network
as an example to validate that the effectiveness of the proposed multi-view attacks.
Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our multi-view attack strategies
are capable of attacking the multi-view deep models, and we additionally find that
multi-view models are more robust than single-view models.
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1 Introduction
Deep machine learning models have achieved great success in many fields, such as
natural language processing [12, 55], speech recognition [13, 41], computer vision
[24], and medical diagnosis [1, 17]. However, it is found that these deep machine
learning models are extremely susceptible to the adversarial perturbation: the de-
cision made by the well-trained model can be changed by adding imperceptible
perturbation to the input [49, 8]. For the exiting machine learning classifiers, even
if the benign examples are added with some slight perturbations, most of them will
output incorrect classification results. Moreover, though the perturbations added
would be visually indistinguishable to humans, these models misclassify adversar-
ial examples with high confidence. In other words, the model believes that the
predictions are natural, and thus is very confident. Utilizing the vulnerability of
deep machine learning models to adversarial examples, adversaries can easily per-
form malicious attacks, which poses security concerns. Furthermore, the work in
[25] has shown that adversarial examples are possible in the real world by simply
taking pictures of the object. When these systems, such as the driverless car sys-
tem, are applied in the real world, there will be huge security risks. Consequently,
the robustness of deep machine learning models against adversarial attacks has
become a crucial area of research and attracted wide attention for recent years
[4, 49, 18, 50, 2].
The existence of adversarial examples poses a serious challenge to the security
of machine learning models. Various kinds of methods of adversarial attack were
proposed in prior work [25, 37, 30, 33, 20, 15, 54, 43, 42]. According to the level
of adversaries’ knowledge about the target model, they can be divided into two
categories: white-box threat model and black-box threat model. The adversarial
examples crafted by these methods do cause a large class of models to assign
incorrect labels to most of them.
However, in addition to the well-studied single-view models, more and more
multi-view models have been proposed, which effectively improve performance
by making full use of the information from multiple views. The multi-view models
include three main categories [60]: i) Co-training style models [35, 32, 46] maximize
the consistency between different views by training alternately, which were inspired
by co-training [7]; ii) Co-regularization style models [47, 45, 57] maximize the
likelihood on the single view and constrain the predictions of different views to be
as consistent as possible, which were achieved by adding a regularization term in
the objective function; iii) Margin consistency style models [29, 10] leverage the
latent consistency among multiple views and model the margin variables on each
view. Recently, some multi-view deep models were developed, such as multi-view
convolutional neural network (MVCNN) [44], Show-and-Tell [52], Show-Attend-
and-Tell [59], NeuralTalk [22], and MVCRF [48], which have made remarkable
progress in 3D shape classification, image captioning, sequence labeling and other
popular tasks.
Although multi-view models have wide applications and superior performance,
to our best knowledge, there is no specific research on adversarial attacks for multi-
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view models. As we all know, the specific architecture and gradient information
for the target model is unavailable for adversaries in the black-box setting. Black-
box threat models do not differentiate between single-view and multi-view models.
However, there is a difference in white-box attacks on multi-view and single-view
models. Specifically, we have access to the gradient of the model to determine the
direction of the adversarial perturbation in the white-box setting. For single-view
models, since only one view is available, the construction of the adversarial ex-
ample requires only calculating the gradient of the loss function, which is used to
determine whether some value in each example should be increased or decreased.
Current white-box threat models work as mentioned above and are ill-suited for
multi-view models. More specifically, the existing white-box threat models implic-
itly assume that each view has the same impact on the resulting classification, and
we refer them as the single-view attack. However, based on the consistency and
complementary principle for multiple views [58], we have to treat each view dif-
ferently. Namely, to craft the adversarial example sufficient to fool the multi-view
model, we have to take the partial derivative of each view separately to determine
the corresponding perturbation direction. Besides, to evaluate the sensitivity of
the target model performance to changes made to different views, the proposed
multi-view attack also needs to achieve the separate attack for one certain view. In
this paper, we attempt to propose effective multi-view attacks against multi-view
deep models. Besides, it is an open problem whether multi-view models are more
robust to adversarial examples, and thereby we make comparisons with general
single-view models and evaluate the relative robustness for multi-view and single-
view models. As previously mentioned, black-box threat models do not distinguish
between single-view and multi-view models, therefore we focus on the white-box
threat model.
Generally, adversarial attacks are specific to a certain model. However, without
loss of generality, the adversarial examples crafted for one model are likely to be
misclassified by others [49, 27, 31]. With the good transferability of adversarial ex-
amples, this paper takes the adversarial attack on MVCNN [44] as an example to
empirically study the effectiveness of the proposed multi-view attack. We propose
two attack strategies for the specific multi-view scenario: i) Assuming that the
underlying model on which the multi-view model is based is known, we propose
the two-stage attack (TSA). Specifically, we first attack the underlying model,
namely the single-view model, and then attack the target multi-view model with
the crafted adversarial examples. Here, we adopt three state-of-the-art methods,
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [18], basic iterative method (BIM) [25], and
momentum iterative method (MIM) [15]; ii) If we have access to the target multi-
view model, we then further propose the end-to-end attack (ETEA). As previously
mentioned, the exiting single-view attack does not apply to attacking the target
model under the multi-view scenario. We develop three effective attack methods
applicable to multi-view models. The developed multi-view attack methods are re-
ferred to as mFGSM, mBIM, and mMIM, respectively, which generate multi-view
adversarial examples in an end-to-end fashion. In order to craft imperceptible ex-
amples, we require the Lp norm of the adversarial perturbation to be less than the
required , which is commonly exploited in adversarial attacks. As an illustration,
the multi-view adversarial example crafted by the mBIM is shown in Fig. 1.
To investigate the sensitivity of the target model performance to changes made
to different views, we utilize the TSA and ETEA two strategies to first attack
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Fig. 1 We show the multi-view adversarial example crafted by the proposed mBIM method.
For each view, the first column is the original example, the second column is the crafted
adversarial example, and the third column is the adversarial perturbation added.
a single view of the model separately and then attack all views. Subsequently,
to achieve a relatively ideal attack at the lowest budget, we adopt the ETEA
strategy to attack some views of the target model greedily. Experimental results
show that multi-view models are more difficult to attack than single-view models.
Specifically, the fooling rates of the multi-view model is strictly lower than the
single-view models. Besides, the multi-view model cannot be successfully attacked
when only one single view is perturbed; only simultaneous attacks on all or some
valued views can improve the fooling rate of the target multi-view model to some
extent. However, for the single-view model, all attacks can cause a dramatic drop
in model performance. Moreover, the experimental results fully demonstrate that
ETEA can make more effective attacks for multi-view models, whether it is the
single-view attack or the all-view attack. Especially, the ultimate fooling rate for
all-view attacks by exploiting the ETEA strategy is more than 60%1.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We propose two strategies for the adversarial attacks on multi-view deep mod-
els, referred to as the two-stage attack (TSA) and end-to-end attack (ETEA).
– We develop three multi-view attack methods, named mFGSM, mBIM, and
mMIM, which have been experimentally proved to be effective against multi-
view models.
– We are the first to show that multi-view models are more adversarially robust
than single-view models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
some relevant work. Section 3 introduces some problem formulation and primary
models on which our work is built. Section 4 elaborates on the proposed TSA
1 The average classification accuracy of MVCNN for original testing examples is 94.5%.
After using the ETEA strategy for adversarial attacks, the accuracy rate decreases to about
30%.
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and ETEA strategies for the attacks of the multi-view models. Section 5 reports
extensive experimental results that confirm the effectiveness of the proposed multi-
view attacks. Finally, we summarize this paper and discuss possible future work
in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Machine learning models are challenged by adversarial attacks. Their high vulner-
ability has attracted widespread attention, and the security research of models has
become an active topic [14, 21, 9]. Although it is often mistaken that the vulner-
ability to adversarial attacks is the weakness of deep models, the same problem
exists on traditional machine learning models [5, 6, 16]. We restrict ourselves to
the work of adversarial attacks on deep machine learning models in this paper.
Regarding the adversarial vulnerability for deep machine learning models, there
are the following speculative explanations: i) The model is trained by the finite
data set and has incomplete generalization [3]; ii) The model consists of highly
linear components for facilitating training [18]. The existing attack methods can
be divided into two categories: optimization-based methods and gradient-based
methods. For the optimization-based methods, the box-constrained L-BFGS [49]
is one of the most representative methods. Given an original example x, the search
for the corresponding adversarial example xadv can be formalized as follows:
arg min
xadv
||xadv − x||2
s.t. f(xadv) = y
∗, xadv ∈ [0, 1]m,
where y∗ is the desired label. However, this problem is hard to solve for deep
models due to their non-convexity and non-linearity [26]. Therefore, the authors
converted the search for minimum perturbations into the following optimization
problem:
arg min
xadv
λ||xadv − x||2 + J(xadv, y∗)
s.t. xadv ∈ [0, 1]m,
where λ is the trade-off parameter and J(·) is a loss function. This kind of meth-
ods directly optimize the L2 distance between the original example x and the
adversarial example xadv, and their main drawbacks are high computational cost
and quite slow. Besides, there are many gradient-based methods for adversarial
attacks. FGSM was first proposed in [18], which constructed xadv by linearizing
the L∞ neighborhood of x. However, compared with L-BFGS, FGSM attack has a
lower success rate. For the purposes of making a nice tradeoff between attack suc-
cess rate and computational cost, an iterative variant of FGSM, known as BIM or
I-FGSM, was introduced in [25]. Subsequently, Dong et al. [15] further integrated
momentum into the iterative process. They showed that the proposed MIM attack
improved the success rate and transferability of the generated adversarial exam-
ples. Simply put, gradient-based methods transform the process of constructing
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xadv from x into the following optimization problem:
arg max
xadv
J(xadv, ytrue)
s.t. ||xadv − x||∞ ≤ ,
where ytrue is the true label for x, and  is the size of adversarial perturbation. In
simple terms, they use the calculated gradient to continuously update the input
so that it can be eventually misclassified by the model, instead of updating the
model parameters. In short, the aforementioned methods use backpropagation to
transform the construction of adversarial examples into an optimization problem
based on the loss function.
Adversarial attacks pose potential security risks on machine learning models in
practical applications. More importantly, the work by Szegedy et al. [49] reported
that adversarial examples could generalize across models. That is, adversarial ex-
amples designed for the model M1 are often likely to fool the model M2. It was
also found that adversarial transferability works in real-world scenarios [36, 38].
Trame`r et al. [51] showed that there was a significant overlap in the adversarial
subspace between different models by empirically, and considered that it was a
source of adversarial transferability. Recent work considered the phenomenon of
adversarial transferability from a theoretical standpoint [11].
Based on that the same adversarial examples can be misclassified with high
probability by different models, we focus on the adversarial attacks on the state-of-
the-art MVCNN model [44], which is a multi-view model for 3D shape classifica-
tion. Unlike previous work mentioned above, this paper proposes attack methods
applicable for multi-view models and takes the adversarial attacks against MVCNN
as an example to show the effectiveness of proposed multi-view attacks. We ad-
ditionally evaluate the relative robustness of multi-view models and single-view
models against adversarial examples.
3 Problem Formulation and Primary Models
This section first defines the problem to be solved, then describes the threat model,
and finally gives a brief introduction to the multi-view target model attacked in
this paper.
3.1 Problem Description
Consider an original example x ∈ X with ground-truth label ytrue ∈ Y. The deep
machine learning model is denoted by Ψ , which outputs a predictive label ypred
for x. Adversarial attacks aim to find an example xadv = x + η(x) to fool the
target model, where η(x) is the minor perturbation added to the x. Formally, the
desired xadv needs to meet the following two requirements:
1) Imperceptible: xadv looks so similar to the original x that people can not tell
them apart visually. Generally, the Lp norm of the perturbation is required to
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not exceed the allowed constant , ||η(x)||p ≤ , where p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}. The Lp
norm is formulated as follows:
||η(x)||p =
(
K∑
k=1
|η(x)k|p
) 1
p
,
where k is the number of coordinates. In particular, L∞ norm is considered as
the optimal metric [53], and thus the adversarial methods in this paper use the
L∞ norm to quantify the similarity between the original example x and the
adversarial example xadv.
2) Missclassification: At the beginning, the target model Ψ can predict correct
label for x, i.e., Ψ(x) = ytrue. However, after making a small change to x, Ψ
alters the output to any class label that is different from the ground-truth label
ytrue. Specifically, ypred = Ψ(xadv) and ypred 6= ytrue. In other words, our goal
is to craft the adversarial example xadv, which forces Ψ to predict an incorrect
label, and it is not a matter of concern which class the incorrect label falls into.
Note that the adversarial examples are constructed in the process of testing.
That is, the adversarial attacks are directly performed on the well-trained model.
Any attack on the training phase is beyond our consideration.
3.2 Threat Model
According to the varying amount of knowledge about the target model Ψ by ad-
versaries, the scenarios for adversarial attacks can be divided into the white-box
threat model and black-box threat model. Specifically, the white-box threat model
refers to that the adversaries have full knowledge about Ψ , including the model ar-
chitecture, training parameters, etc. In particular, the model gradient is available
under the white-box setting, and the adversary can effectively craft adversarial
examples with gradient descent [49, 34, 8, 28]. It should be emphasized that the
computed gradient by the target model is used to update the examples rather
than the model parameters. In principle, the perturbation added to the original
example x should be indistinguishable to humans, while Ψ misclassifies it with
high confidence. Generally, we can adopt early stopping to control the perturba-
tion norm so that it satisfies the constraint of ||η(x)||p ≤  [18, 25], or optimize the
norm by adding it to the objective function as a regularization term [8]. When zero
knowledge about Ψ is known, it belongs to the black-box threat model. Although it
may not know any internal details of the model, the adversary is allowed to query
Ψ . In other words, the adversary can feed the input to Ψ and observe the output,
which is the predicted class label or the confidence score that the input belongs
to each category.
Although some effective black-box threat models have been proposed [43, 42],
we focus on the white-box threat models rather than the black-box threat models,
since the latter does not distinguish between multi-view and single-view models.
That is, the related work for black-box models is complementary and independent
of ours. We aim to propose effective multi-view attacks for multi-view deep models.
8 Xuli Sun, Shiliang SunB
3.3 Target Model
Considering that adversarial examples have good transferability among different
models, this paper carries out adversarial attacks on the multi-view convolutional
neural network (MVCNN) [44]. The MVCNN is a state-of-the-art multi-view model
for 3D shape classification, and we take it as an example to investigate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed multi-view attacks. Specifically, the MVCNN model we
adopted is based on the standard VGG11 network2, which is composed of five
convolutional (Conv) layers, three fully connected (FC) layers, and a softmax
classification layer. MVCNN takes the rendered images from multiple views as
input. More specifically, the images on each view pass through the Conv layers
of VGG11 independently, and all the parameters are shared at this stage. Then
the extracted features from multiple views are aggregated by the “view-pooling”
layer, and fed to the remaining non-linear layers for shape classification. Note that
the “view-pooling” layer is added before FC1 (the first FC layer) and after Conv5
(the last Conv layer), where the element-wise maximum operation is performed to
fuse the features across different views.
To further compare the relative robustness of the multi-view model and single-
view model against adversarial examples, we make adversarial attacks on baseline
single-view models with the white-box threat models used in the two-stage attack
(TSA) strategy introduced in Section 4.1. We refer to these single-view models as
SVCNN in this paper. Note that the SVCNN models are based on the VGG11 pre-
trained on ImageNet and further fine-tune by a single view or simple concatenation
of multiple views. The training process for MVCNN and the SVCNN models are
introduced in Section 5.3.
4 Methodology
In this section, we elaborate on the two proposed attack strategies for multi-view
models: two-stage attack (TSA) and end-to-end attack (ETEA). It has been shown
that a considerable part of the adversarial examples crafted for one model can
effectively fool others, sometimes with a success rate of up to 100% [36, 27]. That
is, the adversarial examples may generalize among different models, which is also
known as adversarial transferability. Therefore, to investigate the effectiveness of
the proposed multi-view attacks, we take the above MVCNN model as an example
and perform adversarial attacks on it.
4.1 Two-Stage Attack
Assume that we do not have direct access to the target multi-view model, the
single-view model however on which the target model is based is available for us.
With the mild assumption, we first propose the two-stage attack (TSA) strategy.
The main idea of TSA is to first attack the single-view model on which the target
2 Different convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures can be used for MVCNN,
such as ResNet-M [19]. However, we find experimentally that these models have comparable
performance. Therefore, this paper adopts the common version, the MVCNN based on the
VGG11.
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multi-view model is based, and then attack the multi-view model with the gener-
ated examples. By TSA strategy, we can compare the relative robustness of the
multi-view model and single-view model and directly extend the existing attack
methods onto the multi-view scenario. The first stage adopts three state-of-the-art
attack methods to craft adversarial examples for the single-view model. They are
fast gradient sign method (FGSM), basic iterative methods (BIM), and momen-
tum iterative method (MIM), all of which belong to the gradient-based methods.
The three methods are used for non-target attacks in this paper, as is done in most
work. Recall that the non-target attack refers to making the target model predict
any incorrect labels for the adversarial example. The following is a brief review of
the three attack methods.
4.1.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
FGSM was proposed by Goodfellow et al. [18]. It crafts the optimal adversarial
example xadv by maximizing the loss function. FGSM works by using the gradient
sign to estimate the perturbation that satisfies the L∞ norm bound ||η(x)||∞ ≤
. Here,  is the max value of allowed adversarial perturbation. Formally, the
perturbation for the original example x is written as follows:
η(x) =  · sign
(
∇xJ(x, ytrue)
)
, (1)
where x represents the input image, ytrue is the ground-truth label for x, and the
function J(·) denotes the loss function. We adopt the commonly used cross-entropy
loss in this paper. Note that the parameters of the model are intentionally omitted
here because our adversarial attacks are performed on the well-trained model.
Based on the above setting, the corresponding adversarial example for x can
be obtained as follows:
xadv = x+ η(x). (2)
4.1.2 Basic Iterative Methods (BIM)
BIM introduced in [25] intuitively extends FGSM. It increases the value of the loss
function by moving multiple times along the direction of the gradient sign with
smaller step size α, instead of moving one step with step size . Here, α = T , and
T is the number of iteration steps. Moreover, it takes the clip operation for the
updated result at each step, by which restricting the generated example in the 
vicinity of x. Formally, begin by setting xadv(0) = x, then for each iteration,
xadv(t) = Clipx,
{
xadv(t−1) + η(xadv(t−1))
}
, (3)
where xadv(t−1) and xadv(t) are the adversarial examples in the t−1 iteration and
the t iteration, respectively. Furthermore,
η(xadv(t−1)) = α · sign
(
∇xJ(xadv(t−1), ytrue)
)
, (4)
is the perturbation added to the xadv(t−1). After T iterations, we can obtain the
final adversarial example xadv = xadv(T ).
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4.1.3 Momentum Iterative Method (MIM)
MIM is a variant of BIM, inspired by the momentum method [40], which can
escape the local maximum by remembering previous gradients. MIM integrates
the momentum term into the iterative procedure to generate adversarial samples.
Let T be the total number of iteration steps. Then the generation of the adversarial
sample in the t iteration by MIM is as follows:
xadv(t) = xadv(t−1) + α · sign(gt), (5)
where α = /T is the step size, and the accumulated gradient gt can be written as
gt = µ · gt−1 + ∇xJ(xadv(t−1), ytrue)||∇xJ(xadv(t−1), ytrue)||1 . (6)
Here, µ represents the decay factor.
As mentioned before, the TSA strategy assumes the gradient of the multi-view
model is not directly obtainable, but the single-view model however on which
the target multi-view model is based is known. TSA first directly attacks the
corresponding single-view model to generate adversarial examples for each view,
and then these examples are used for the multi-view model to achieve the attack,
by which to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to changes made to each view.
Specifically, the first stage focuses on exploiting the gradient information to guide
the discovery of the adversarial direction and then crafted adversarial examples,
which are very similar to original examples but can fool the single-view model
SVCNN. The second stage then uses the crafted adversarial examples to attack
the MVCNN.
The TSA with BIM attack is summarized in Algorithm 1.
4.2 End-to-End Attack
Though the existing single-view attack methods have been proven to be simple
and effective [49, 8, 28], as discussed previously, they are not suitable for multi-
view models. To directly attack the target multi-view model, we further propose
an end-to-end attack (ETEA) strategy, in which three effective multi-view attack
methods are developed, called mFGSM, mBIM, and mMIM. The main idea of
ETEA is to use the multi-view attack methods to attack the target model in an
end-to-end fashion. For clarity, this paper focuses on the mBIM attack in our
discussion about ETEA. We show the experimental results for all attack methods
in Section 5.
Given an input-label pair (x1, x2, · · · , xV , ytrue), where x1 denotes the original
example on the first view and x2 indicates the original example on the second
view. For clarity, we denote the original example from multiple views as x, and
the set of original examples is denoted by X, i.e., x = {x1, x2, · · · , xV } ∈ X. More
specifically, ytrue is the corresponding true label for x, and V represents the total
number of views of the example, whose value depends on the specific data set.
For a given x with the ground-truth label ytrue, the cross-entropy loss applied to
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Algorithm 1 Two-Stage Attack (TSA) with BIM
# Stage 1: Single-view model attack.
Input: Well-trained single-view model Ψv with the loss function J(·), original example set
for the v-th view Xv , true label set Y, the allowed value , and the number of iteration in
the first stage T1.
Output: Adversarial example set for the v-th view Xvadv .
1: Initialize Xvadv = ∅ and step size α =

T1
;
2: for each xv ∈ Xv do
3: Initialize xv
adv(0)
= xv ;
4: for t1 = 1 to T1 do
5: Input xv
adv(t1−1) to Ψv ;
6: Compute the perturbation for xv
adv(t1−1) by applying the gradient sign as
η(xvadv(t1−1)) = α · sign
(
∇xvJ(xvadv(t1−1), y
v
true)
)
;
7: Update the adversarial example as
xvadv(t1) = Clipx,
{
xvadv(t1−1) + η(x
v
adv(t1−1))
}
;
8: end for
9: xvadv = x
v
adv(T1)
and add xvadv to X
v
adv ;
10: end for
11: Return Xvadv with each x
v
adv satisfies ||η(xv)||∞ ≤ .
# Stage 2: Multi-view model attack.
Input: Adversarial example set Xvadv , original example set X
∗ = X\{xv} that excluding
the original examples on the v-th view, true label set Y, and the number of iteration in the
second stage T2.
Output: Average classification accuracy Acc.
1: Initialize Acc = 0;
2: for t2 = 1 to T2 do
3: Input {Xvadv ,X∗} to the multi-view model Ψ ;
4: Obtain the t2-th classification accuracy Acct2 ;
5: Acc← Acc+Acct2 ;
6: end for
7: Return Acc = Acc
T2
.
integer class labels is equal to the negative logarithm probability of the true class
label given x, and this relationship can be formalized as follows:
J(x, ytrue) = −log pΨ (ytrue|x).
To make the multi-view model Ψ predict an incorrect label for the adversarial ex-
ample xadv, i.e., Ψ(xadv) 6= ytrue, we need to minimize the probability of correctly
classifying xadv. It can be written as follows:
max
xadv
J(xadv, ytrue) = min
ytrue∈Y
log pΨ (ytrue|xadv), (7)
where pΨ (ytrue|xadv) represents the confidence level that the model Ψ divides xadv
into class ytrue, and Y is the set of class labels. Similarly, the set of adversarial
examples is denoted as Xadv, i.e., xadv ∈ Xadv.
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Based on the above setting, we can find an imperceptible xadv by solving the
following problem:
arg max
xadv
J(xadv, ytrue)
s.t. ||η(xv)||∞ ≤ , v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , V }, (8)
where η(xv) is the adversarial perturbation added to the original example on the
v-th view.
Specifically, supposing we attack the v-th view of the example, mBIM requires
an iterative procedure to craft an adversarial example xvadv. In more detail, x
v
takes a step size α in the direction of sign{ ∂J∂xv } for each step, and then we clip
and update the intermediate results. To begin, we set
xvadv(0) = x
v, (9)
and then clip xvadv(i) on each iteration:
xvadv(i) = Clipxv,
{
xvadv(i−1) + α · sign
(∂Ji−1
∂xv
)}
, (10)
where the loss for the i− 1 iteration
Ji−1 = J(xvadv(i−1), ytrue).
More formally, Clip{·} is the clipping function, and its exact form is as follows:
Clipxv,{xvadv(i)} = min
{
255, xv + ,
max{0, xv − , xvadv(i)}
}
,
which is used to ensure the resulting adversarial example is in the L∞ − neigh-
borhood of xv. The ETEA with mBIM attack is summarized in Algorithm 2.
5 Experiments
In this section, we perform adversarial attacks on MVCNN to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed multi-view attacks, and compare the relative robustness
of MVCNN and baseline single-view models.
5.1 Benchmark
Following [44], all our analysis is performed on the widely-used ModelNet40 data
set, which is a shape classification benchmark and consists of 40 categories. In all
experiments, we adopt the standard data division as [56]. Specifically, the train-
ing set and test set contain 9483 and 2468 shapes from 40 common categories,
respectively. Assume that each of the 3D shapes in the data set is placed vertically
(parallel to the z-axis). A virtual camera is placed every 30 degrees in the vertical
radial position to generate the 2D images for 3D shapes from multiple views. It can
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Algorithm 2 End-to-End Attack (ETEA) with mBIM
Input: Well-trained multi-view model Ψ with loss function J(·), original example set X, true
label set Y, the allowed value , and the total number of iteration T .
Output: Average classification accuracy Acc.
1: Initialize Acc = 0, adversarial example set Xadv = ∅;
2: for each x ∈ X do
3: Initialize xadv according to the Eq. (9);
4: Update xadv according to the Eq. (10);
5: if Attack successfully then
6: Add xadv to Xadv ;
7: else
8: Add x to Xadv ;
9: end if
10: end for
11: Input Xadv to Ψ ;
12: for t = 1 to T do
13: Obtain the t-th classification accuracy Acct;
14: Acc← Acc+Acct;
15: end for
16: return Acc = Acc
T
.
also be imagined as there is a virtual camera that takes a picture every time the
shape rotates 30 degrees in the vertical direction. Then the 2D images are rendered
using Phong shading [39]. That is, each 3D shape has different 2D shaded images
from twelve views. After data augmentation, the data set contains 147732 (12311
× 12) rendered images, and the size of each image is 224×224. According to the
good generalization of the adversarial examples, the model trained by different
data sets can still be fooled by the same adversarial samples [49, 27, 31]. That
is different data sets have no significant influence on the effect of the adversarial
attack. Moreover, considering this ModelNet40 is publicly available, and therefore
this paper reports the performance of MVCNN on this data set to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed multi-view attacks.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
This paper adopts two evaluation metrics common for the adversarial attacks:
the classification accuracy and fooling rate. Specifically, in the experiments for
the adversarial attacks on single-view models, we show the average classification
accuracy before and after perturbations, Accorig vs Accadv, to demonstrate the
general vulnerability for single-view models. Formally,
Acc =
1
T
·
T∑
t=1
N∑
j=1
Ct(xj , ytrue), (11)
where ytrue represents the ground-truth label for the original image, N is the
number of testing examples, and T is the number of iterations. The function C(·)
is an indicator function, and the formal definition for it can be written as follows:
C(x, ytrue) =
{
0, if ypred 6= ytrue
1, otherwise.
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Here, yprec is the class label predicted by the model. In short, this function achieves
value 1 if and only if x can be classified correctly into the ground-truth category.
The adversarial attacks on the target models may not be successful. That is,
the model may still be able to correctly classify the adversarial examples generated
by different methods. Therefore, we adopt the average fooling rate (FR) to show
the results of adversarial attacks on the multi-view model and single-view models,
which is used to make a more intuitive comparison of their relative robustness.
Formally,
FR = Accorig −Accadv, (12)
where Accorig is the average classification accuracy of the model on the original
examples, and Accadv is the average classification accuracy on the generated ad-
versarial examples. We can intuitively see the degradation extent of the model
performance with FR.
5.3 Setup
5.3.1 Model Training
Our all adversarial attacks are on well-trained models, and any attack on the
training procedure is not considered in this paper. The model training procedure
is as follows:
– We train individually a single-view CNN (SVCNN) model with the rendered
images from each view, which is based on the VGG11 pre-trained on ImageNet.
For example, during SVCNN1 training, the images on the first view are input
to VGG11. After 30 epochs, there are twelve well-trained SVCNN models,
we refer them to SVCNN1, SVCNN2, · · · , SVCNN12. Note that we further
train the thirteenth single-view model SVCNN13, which is trained with a high-
dimensional view formed by the concatenation of all views.
– MVCNN training needs to go through two stages: i) The images on a single
view are successively input into VGG11, which is pre-trained on ImageNet,
to fine-tune the model parameters. It can be regarded as the general image
classification task; ii) The view-pooling layer is combined to jointly classify the
images from multiple views. The training procedures for two stages are both
set to 30 epochs, and the batch sizes are 64 and 96 for the first stage and the
second stage, respectively. The training for MVCNN can be finished using the
publicly available implementation3.
Note that all SVCNN models are trained separately with the corresponding
single view. In particular, SVCNN13 is trained with a single view formed by simple
concatenation of all views. Moreover, to make a fair comparison, MVCNN and
thirteen single-view models are trained using Adam optimizer [23] with the initial
learning rate 5× 10−5, and the weight decay is 0.001.
3 Different versions of implementation have been released by the authors’ Lab. In this paper,
we adopt the PyTorch implementation
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5.3.2 Adversarial Attacks
To fully demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed multi-view attacks, we run a
series of experiments. Besides, to compare the relative robustness of the multi-view
model and single-view models, we first attack SVCNN models by exploiting the
state-of-the-art attack methods, FGSM, BIM, and MIM4. Then the proposed TSA
and ETEA are used to achieve the adversarial attacks on MVCNN. In particular,
we attempt to adopt two strategies to attack MVCNN, respectively. We first attack
only one of the views to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to changes made to
each view, and then attack all views simultaneously. Furthermore, based on the
better attack performance achieved by ETEA, we attack some important views in
a greedy fashion, hoping to achieve an effective attack with the as little budget as
possible. For all attack methods, as in most prior work, we adopt the common L∞
norm, and the maximal iterative step is set to 100. It should be noted that the
magnitude of the adversarial perturbation must not be too small. For example,
all attacks cannot succeed at =0.01. Without loss of generality, the larger the
perturbation added, the more likely the attacks to succeed. However, we find that
=0.1 is sufficient to complete the adversarial attack. Meanwhile, the perturbation
of this magnitude is imperceptible for humans. Therefore, we do not explore it too
much in this paper.
5.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, we first present the results of adversarial attacks on SVCNN models
in Table 1. Then we report the corresponding attack results for MVCNN, which
are presented in Tables 2, 3, and Fig. 2, respectively.
5.4.1 SVCNN Attack Results
We first evaluate the adversarial robustness of SVCNN models including SVCNN1,
SVCNN2, · · · SVCNN13, which have been trained with original images from the
associated view. Formally, we adopt FGSM, BIM, and MIM methods to attack
the above thirteen single-view models, respectively. The average fooling rate and
average classification accuracies of SVCNN models on the original and adversarial
images are demonstrated in Table 1. We can see that all SVCNN models obtain
excellent performance on the shape classification task: the original average accu-
racy is more than 90% for each model. However, they are highly vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. The average classification accuracy for each SVCNN model is
less than 35% on crafted adversarial images. In particular, we can see from Table
1 that although SVCNN1 achieves the highest accuracy on the original examples,
it also has a very high FR. That is, the performance of SVCNN1 is the worst
after the attack, except for SVCNN13. This phenomenon suggests that view 1
may contain more useful information, and therefore it is more effective to attack
this view. To verify this idea we attack each view separately in the adversarial
attack on MVCNN. Besides, we also refer to original examples and find that view
1 is the front of the object. The further the other views deviate from the front,
4 The code of these methods is publicly available at https://github.com/baidu/AdvBox.
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Table 1 The results of adversarial attacks on SVCNN models. Accorig and Accadv are the
average classification accuracies on original examples and adversarial examples. FR is the
average fooling rate. Column Accadv and column FR from left to right are the results of
adversarial attacks with FGSM, BIM, and MIM.
Model Accorig (%)
Accadv (%) FR (%)
FGSM BIM MIM FGSM BIM MIM
SVCNN1 92.75 25.49 25.47 26.82 67.26 67.28 65.93
SVCNN2 92.53 29.09 29.10 29.90 63.44 63.43 62.63
SVCNN3 92.64 33.11 32.84 34.73 59.53 59.80 57.91
SVCNN4 92.01 27.88 27.68 29.41 64.13 64.33 62.60
SVCNN5 92.04 32.83 32.91 33.65 59.21 59.13 58.39
SVCNN6 91.55 30.76 30.54 32.11 60.79 61.01 59.44
SVCNN7 91.77 25.75 25.76 27.27 66.02 66.01 64.50
SVCNN8 91.83 25.72 27.87 28.84 66.11 63.96 62.99
SVCNN9 92.33 30.84 31.06 32.80 61.49 61.27 59.53
SVCNN10 91.63 27.26 27.28 29.01 64.37 64.35 62.62
SVCNN11 92.53 31.96 32.21 34.23 60.57 60.32 58.30
SVCNN12 92.35 31.50 31.39 32.70 60.85 60.96 59.65
SVCNN13 92.42 23.96 23.84 25.02 68.46 68.58 67.40
the more difficult it is to attack the corresponding single-view model trained with
those views. That is, the single-view model has smaller FR. This suggests that
the probability of success against an attack is related to the view being attacked.
For SVCNN13, it achieves the highest FR compared to the other 12 single-view
models. Although SVCNN13 leverages data from multiple views (simple concate-
nation), its architecture is still a generic single-view model. Random perturbations
of certain dimensions can misclassify the model, which makes it easier to attack.
Results in Table 1 show that FGSM and BIM attacks achieve comparable perfor-
mance, and are more effective than MIM under the same parameter settings. The
experimental results strongly demonstrate the vulnerability of single-view models.
5.4.2 TSA Results
In the experiments of adversarial attacks on MVCNN by TSA strategy, we attempt
to only attack a single view at first. It can be seen from Table 2 that the maximum
fooling rate is 0.41%, which indicates that MVCNN have certain robustness against
the adversarial images. Then we attack all views by two kinds of adversarial images:
one is the adversarial images generated by attacking SVCNN13 (corresponding to
the All views 1 in Table 2), and the other is the adversarial image set for SVCNN1-
12, i.e., {X1adv,X2adv, · · · ,X12adv} (corresponding to the All views 2 in Table 2).
From Table 2, it can be seen that attacking each view alone has different
effects on the performance of MVCNN. That is, the attack on a certain view
may be more effective than others, which indicates that each view has different
importance for the model to correctly classify. Moreover, it is clear that the clas-
sification performance of MVCNN can be significantly reduced when attacking all
views. Specifically, if only one of the views is attacked, other views can still help
the model make better predictions due to the consistency and complementary
principle among multiple views. The attacks on all views can be very successful.
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Table 2 The results of two-stage adversarial attacks on MVCNN, using the adversarial ex-
amples crafted for SVCNN by FGSM, BIM, and MIM.
Attacked-view
FR (%)
FGSM BIM MIM
view 1 0.25 0.27 0.25
view 2 0.22 0.20 0.22
view 3 0.16 0.16 0.17
view 4 0.40 0.41 0.40
view 5 0.16 0.23 0.22
view 6 0.12 0.14 0.14
view 7 0.29 0.30 0.29
view 8 0.13 0.11 0.10
view 9 0.11 0.18 0.16
view 10 0.34 0.33 0.31
view 11 0.19 0.21 0.18
view 12 0.13 0.11 0.16
All views 1 7.77 7.75 8.35
All views 2 29.27 31.10 27.75
This shows multi-view models themselves have a certain degree of adversarial ro-
bustness. However, as shown in Table 1, all attacks on the single-view model can
cause a dramatic drop in model performance. This demonstrates indirectly that
multi-view models are more robust than single-view models. Further, it can be
found that the lowest FR of single-view models in Table 1 is close to 58%, while
the highest FR of the multi-view model in Table 2 is only 31%. Comparing the
FR of MVCNN in Table 2 with SVCNN models in Table 1, we can conclude that
the multi-view model is indeed more robust to adversarial examples. Table 2 also
presents that All views 1 attack is not as effective as All views 2 attack: the latter’s
FR reaches more than 31%, while the former’s FR is less than 10%. Each view
contains different information. Without loss of generality, a specific attack on each
view is more effective than the random perturbation of a high-dimensional view
formed by the concatenation of all views. Therefore, we can find that the FR of all
views 1 is less than all views 2. Further, as we can see that the adversarial images
generated by MIM are superior to FGSM and BIM in All views 1 attack, and BIM
outperforms the other two methods in All views 2 attack.
5.4.3 ETEA Results
We use mFGSM, mBIM, and mMIM methods to attack MVCNN with ETEA
strategy, respectively. Table 3 reports the corresponding results, which include the
cases that only a single view is attacked and all views are attacked. All experimen-
tal results indicate the effectiveness of the developed methods: the average fooling
rates for the three kinds of attacks all exceed 60%. Similarly, the attack is frus-
trated when we attack only a single view, and when all views are attacked can the
model classification performance be significantly reduced. As mentioned above,
the failure of single-view attacks indicates that the multi-view model itself has
certain adversarial robustness, which is mainly attributed to the consistency and
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Table 3 The results of adversarial attacks on MVCNN with mFGSM, mBIM, and mMIM.
Attacked-view
FR (%)
mFGSM mBIM mMIM
view 1 0.73 0.78 0.71
view 2 0.53 0.56 0.58
view 3 0.54 0.52 0.45
view 4 0.80 0.84 0.79
view 5 0.43 0.40 0.43
view 6 0.31 0.40 0.31
view 7 0.53 0.54 0.58
view 8 0.55 0.59 0.55
view 9 0.58 0.65 0.55
view 10 1.02 1.03 0.90
view 11 0.55 0.53 0.48
view 12 0.24 0.23 0.25
All views 62.60 62.11 61.57
complementary principle among multiple views. Further, based on different effects
of single-view attacks, we attack some relatively important views greedily, hoping
to achieve an effective attack with the as little budget as possible, as shown in Fig.
2. We believe that finding the optimal permutation to accomplish the some-view
attack is an important problem, and we will leave it for future work without going
much exploration in this paper. In other words, our multi-view attack methods
are general. They can be applied whether multiple views are directly known from
the feature space or not. That is, if some of the views cannot be available or lost,
we still can perform the some-view attack. It should be emphasized that there is
a trade-off between the attack performance and budget. In the case of a limited
budget, we can consider attacking just some of the views instead, i.e., some-view
attack. For example, Fig. 2 shows that the fooling rate is 20% or higher when
seven important views are attacked. Otherwise, we can choose to attack all views
to achieve the optimal attack effect.
In summary, in the adversarial attacks against MVCNN, all single-view at-
tacks have failed, and attacks on all views can be very successful, which indicates
that multi-view models themselves have a certain degree of adversarial robustness.
Moreover, it can be found that multi-view models are more robust by comparing
the FR of MVCNN and the SVCNN models. Moreover, the attacks under the
ETEA strategy are more effective than those under the TSA strategy, whether
single-view attacks or all-view attacks. This well shows the effectiveness of the
developed multi-view attacks. In addition, since the attack on a certain view may
be more effective, we can consider the some-view attack at a limited budget.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the TSA and ETEA strategies to attack multiple-view
models. In particular, we develop three multi-view attack methods, called mFGSM,
mBIM, and mMIM, which can be used to directly attack multi-view models in
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Fig. 2 The results of adversarial attacks on some views of MVCNN with mFGSM, mBIM,
and mMIM.
an end-to-end fashion. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed multi-view attacks, and we additionally show that multi-view models are
more robust for adversarial attacks, compared to the single-view models.
In this paper, we have considered the problem of adversarial attacks on multi-
view models. In future work, we will focus on the defense task and propose more
effective defense algorithms for multi-view models to further enhance the adver-
sarial robustness of the models.
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